Rövid leírás:
This volume presents fourteen original essays which explore the philosophy of Simon Blackburn, and his lifetime pursuit of a distinctive projectivist and anti-realist research program. The essays document the range and influence of Blackburn’s work and reveal, among other things, the resourcefulness of his brand of philosophical pragmatism.
Hosszú leírás:
This volume presents fourteen original essays which explore the philosophy of Simon Blackburn, one of the UK’s most influential contemporary philosophers. Blackburn is best known to the general public for his attempts to make philosophy accessible to those with little or no formal training, but in professional circles his reputation is based on a lifetime pursuit of his distinctive version of a projectivist and anti-realist research program. As he sees things, we must always try first to understand and explain what we are doing when we think and talk as we do. This research program reaches into nearly all of the main areas of philosophy: metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, moral philosophy, and moral psychology. The books and articles he has written provide us with perhaps the most comprehensive statement and defense of projectivism and anti-realism since Hume. The essays collected here document the range and influence of Blackburn’s work. They reveal, among other things, the resourcefulness of his distinctive brand of philosophical pragmatism.
The range and influence of Simon Blackburn’s work is reflected in the thematic variety of the contributions to this excellent volume edited by Robert N. Johnson and Michael Smith. The quality of the essays is consistently high, and together they provide a comprehensive, in-depth treatment of Blackburn’s many original and controversial ideas
Tartalomjegyzék:
Introduction
Apologia pro Vita Sua
Part One: Metaphysics and Epistemology
Defending Folk Psychology: The Limits of Coalitions
Causation, Projection, Inference, and Agency
Singular Belief
What Quasi-Realists Can Say About Knowledge
The Metaphysics of Artistic Expression: A Case Study in Projectivism
The Impossible Necessity of ‘Filling in Space’
What is Colour? A Defense of Colour Primitivism
From Quasi-Realism to Global Expressivism–and Back Again?
Part Two: Metaethics and Moral Psychology
Another World: The Metaethics and Metametaethics of Reasons Fundamentalism
Improving Sensibilities
Modest Quasi-Realism and the Problem of Deep Moral Error
Just How Do Passions Rule? The (More) Compleat Humean
Higher-Order Attitudes, Frege’s Abyss, and the Truth in Propositions
The Fugitive Thought: Blackburn on Reasons
